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INTRODUCTION
As the gig economy continues to grow,1 concerns have been raised that 
gig economy workers (“on-demand workers”) do not enjoy the same protec-
tions under the law that traditional employees do.2 And those concerns 
should come as no surprise given that on-demand workers are not protected 
by state unemployment insurance benefits systems, workers’ compensation 
benefits, state and federal minimum wage and overtime laws, federal anti-
discrimination laws, anti-retaliation laws, federal collective bargaining laws, 
family and medical leave laws, and the benefits of employer contributions 
for Social Security and Medicare taxes.3
This Note focuses on one of the traditional employee protections: the 
right to collective bargaining.4 While several proposals to secure collective 
bargaining rights for on-demand workers have been advanced,5 this Note 
 1.  See Elizabeth Kennedy, Employed by an Algorithm: Labor Rights in the On-Demand Economy,
40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 987, 992 (2017) (noting that the gig economy is projected to be worth $335 Billion 
by 2025).  
 2.  See Dmitri Iglitzin & Jennifer L. Robbins, The City of Seattle’s Ordinance Providing Collective 
Bargaining Rights to Independent Contractor For-Hire Drivers: An Analysis Of The Major Legal Hur-
dles, 38 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 49, 52 (2017).  
 3.  Id.
 4.  29 U.S.C. § 157 (2018). 
 5.  See Rick Bales, Resurrecting Labor, 77 MD. L. REV. 1, 42 (2017) (arguing that the protections 
of the National Labor Relations Act should be extended to on-demand workers); Seth D. Harris & Alan 
B. Krueger, A Proposal for Modernizing Labor Laws for Twenty-First Century Work: The “Independent 
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assesses the legality of an ordinance passed by the City of Seattle, which 
permits drivers who work for companies such as Uber and Lyft (“on-demand 
drivers”) to bargain collectively with those companies (“ride-hailing compa-
nies”).6 This Note sets forth two independent arguments that argue in favor 
of the Ordinance’s legality. First, the Labor Exemption to the Sherman An-
titrust Act exempts the Seattle Ordinance from antitrust liability; and second, 
the Seattle Ordinance does not violate the Sherman Antitrust Act because the 
Ordinance’s pro-competitive effects on the labor market outweigh the Ordi-
nance’s anti-competitive effects under the Rule of Reason. 
Part I outlines the Seattle Ordinance and the current challenge against 
the Ordinance by the United States Chamber of Commerce. Part I also pro-
vides a background on the Labor Exemption to the Sherman Antitrust Act 
and the effects of collective bargaining on competition in the labor market. 
Lastly, Part I offers an overview of the gig economy, ride-hailing companies, 
and the current status of on-demand drivers. It clarifies that on-demand 
workers are independent contractors,7 and that on-demand drivers are a type 
of on-demand worker.8
Part II argues that the Labor Exemption to the Sherman Antitrust Act 
covers the Seattle Ordinance. This section first addresses proposals to cate-
gorize on-demand drivers as employees and contends that such proposals are 
premised on an incorrect understanding of the Labor Exemption; thus, they 
are inadequate solutions to the problem that on-demand workers are unable 
to bargain collectively.9 Instead, by examining the text of the statutes under-
lying the Labor Exemption, the purpose of the Labor Exemption, the current 
conditions of the labor market for on-demand drivers, and Supreme Court 
precedent in Labor Exemption cases, it follows that the Labor Exemption 
covers the relevant labor market and not just those who are statutorily labeled 
as employees. Because the Seattle Ordinance primarily affects only the labor 
market, fits the Supreme Court’s definition of a “mandatory subject of col-
lecting bargaining,” and provides a framework for agreements to be products 
http://www.hamiltonproject.org/papers/modernizing_labor_laws_for_twenty_first_century_work_inde-
pendent_worker [https://perma.cc/5Y84-EWGL] (arguing for a new category of workers (“independent 
workers”) who would have the right to bargain collectively). 
 6.  Seattle, Wash., Ordinance 124968, pmbl. (Dec. 14, 2015). 
 7.  Katy Steinmetz, Exclusive: See How Big the Gig Economy Really is, TIME MAG. (Jan. 6, 2016), 
http://time.com/4169532/sharing-economy-poll/ [https://perma.cc/AC77-LS6P]. 
 8.  Iglitzin & Robbins, supra note 2, at 50.  
 9.  See Henry H. Perritt, Don’t Burn the Looms: Regulation of Uber and Other Gig Labor Markets,
22 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 51, 146–47 (2019) (proposing that classifying on-demand workers as 
employees is an inappropriate solution to remedying the shortcomings faced by on-demand workers under 
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of bona fide arm’s length bargaining,10 Part II concludes that the non-statu-
tory Labor Exemption exempts the Seattle Ordinance from antitrust liability. 
Part III presents an argument that is independent of Part II. Part III ar-
gues that under the Rule of Reason,11 the Seattle Ordinance does not violate 
the Sherman Antitrust Act because the Ordinance’s pro-competitive effects 
on the labor market outweigh the Ordinance’s anti-competitive effects. First, 
Part III contends that, despite the presence of a horizontal agreement between 
the on-demand drivers, it would be inappropriate to apply the per se rule to 
the Ordinance.12 Instead, the Rule of Reason should be applied to fully ana-
lyze the Ordinance’s effects on competition, given that the Ordinance’s 
framework permits agreements between on-demand drivers and ride-hailing 
companies that impose a vertical price restraint.13 Then, Part III applies the 
Rule of Reason to the Seattle Ordinance by weighing the pro-competitive 
effects of a vertical price restraint on the labor market against the horizontal 
agreement’s assumed anti-competitive nature and the vertical price re-
straint’s anti-competitive effects. Ultimately, Part III concludes that the for-
mer outweighs the latter. 
I. BACKGROUND
A. Seattle’s Ordinance & the Challenge by the United States Chamber 
of Commerce 
On December 14, 2015, the City of Seattle enacted Ordinance 124968, 
which permitted on-demand drivers to bargain collectively with ride-hailing 
companies.14 By excluding the Ordinance’s application to those “in the con-
text of an employer-employee relationship,” the Ordinance strictly applies to 
independent contractors.15 Before on-demand drivers can bargain collec-
tively with a ride-hailing company, both the on-demand drivers and the ride-
 10.  See Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 614 (8th Cir. 1976) (ruling that the non-statutory Labor 
Exemption applies when an agreement primarily affects only the parties to the agreement, concerns a 
mandatory subject of collective bargaining, and is a product of a bona-fide arm’s length bargaining). But 
see Clarett v. NFL, 369 F.3d 124, 133–34 (2d Cir. 2004) (rejecting the 3-prong test for applying the non-
statutory Labor Exemption as set forth by the Eighth Circuit in Mackey v. NFL).  
 11.  See Smith v. Pro Football, 593 F.2d 1173, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (“Under the rule of reason, a 
restraint must be evaluated to determine whether it is significantly anticompetitive in purpose or effect.”).  
 12.  See Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886 (2007) (citation omitted) 
(“Restraints that are per se unlawful include horizontal agreements among competitors to fix 
prices . . . .”). 
 13.  See id. at 899 (2007) (“[T]he rule of reason, not a per se rule of unlawfulness, would be the 
appropriate standard to judge vertical price restraints.”).  
 14.  Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. City of Seattle, 890 F.3d 769, 775 (9th Cir. 2018) 
(footnote omitted). 
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hailing company must satisfy certain requirements as set forth by the Ordi-
nance. 
First, an individual (“the representative”) must be selected to represent 
the on-demand drivers; then, the representative must be approved by the City 
of Seattle’s Director of Finance and Administrative Services (“the direc-
tor”).16 Following the director’s approval, the representative must inform the 
ride-hailing company that she or he intends to represent the company’s on-
demand drivers.17 After the ride-hailing company is informed of the intended 
representation, the company must provide the representative with the contact 
information of all on-demand drivers who have provided driving services 
under the company’s platform.18
Next, the representative contacts the on-demand drivers and inquires 
whether they are interested in being represented.19 If interested, the on-de-
mand driver provides the representative with a written statement expressing 
that interest.20 Then, the representative submits these statements to the direc-
tor, and if a majority of the drivers support the representative, the director 
certifies the representative as the sole individual who may represent the on-
demand drivers for that particular ride-hailing company.21
Finally, the representative and the ride-hailing company must meet and 
bargain collectively over a variety of subjects.22 For this Note’s purposes, 
the most important subject is “the nature and amount of payments to be made 
by, or withheld from, the [ride-hailing company] to or by the drivers.”23 If 
an agreement between the representative and ride-hailing company is 
reached, it is submitted to the director who ensures that the agreement com-
plies with the purposes and public policy goals of the Ordinance.24 “If the 
[d]irector finds the agreement compliant, the agreement is final and binding 
on all parties.”25
 16.  SEATTLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE § 6.310.735(C) (2015). It is worth noting that the director 
also oversees business regulations in the taxicab industry in Seattle. See Dep’t of Fin. and Admin. Servs., 
Taxis, For-Hires and Transportation Network Companies, SEATTLE.GOV, https://www.seattle.gov/busi-
ness-regulations/taxis-for-hires-and-tncs (last updated Dec. 13, 2018). 
 17.  § 6.310.735(C)(2).  
 18.  Id. § 6.310.735(D); see City of Seattle, 890 F.3d at 776 (noting that Uber and Lyft provide an 
online platform, which on-demand drivers use to provide individual rides to consumers). 
19. § 6.310.735(E).  
 20.  Id. § 6.310.735(F)(1).  
 21.  Id. § 6.310.735(F). 
 22.  Id. § 6.310.735(H)(1). 
 23.  Id.
 24.  Id. § 6.310.735(H)(2). 
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On the other hand, if the agreement is non-compliant, the director shall 
remand the agreement to the parties with recommendations for how to rem-
edy the agreement’s shortcomings.26 Should the parties fail to reach an 
agreement, “either party must submit to interest arbitration upon the request 
of the other,” and then, a mutually agreed upon arbitrator shall propose an 
agreement between the parties.27 If the director finds the arbitrator’s pro-
posed agreement to be compliant, then it becomes binding on the parties.28
At any time during the term of the agreement, the parties may propose 
amendments to the agreement, which must be approved by the director.29
On March 3, 2016, the United States Chamber of Commerce filed a 
lawsuit, arguing that the Ordinance violated federal antitrust law and was 
preempted by federal antitrust law and the National Labor Relations Act.30
The District Court for the Western District of Washington held that the 
Chamber lacked standing because no representatives had been approved by 
the director, so the case was dismissed.31 On March 3, 2017, the director 
approved an individual to be a representative, which prompted the Chamber 
to file suit again, challenging the Ordinance on the same grounds as before 
and requesting a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the Ordi-
nance.32 The District Court granted the Chamber’s preliminary injunction, 
but on August 1, 2017, the District Court granted the City of Seattle’s motion 
to dismiss.33
The Chamber filed an appeal and an emergency motion for an injunc-
tion against the Ordinance in the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit.34 The Court of Appeals granted the Chamber’s emergency 
motion pending the appeal.35 Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit reversed the Dis-
trict Court’s dismissal of the Chamber’s federal antitrust claims.36 Although 
the Ninth Circuit’s decision was primarily premised on doctrines of preemp-
tion and state immunity, which are outside the scope of this Note, the federal 
 26.  Id. § 6.310.735(H)(2)(b). 
 27.  Id. § 6.310.735(I).  
 28.  Id. § 6.310.735(I)(4)(a). 
 29.  Id. § 6.310.735(J).  
 30.  Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. City of Seattle, 890 F.3d 769, 778 (9th Cir. 
2018). 
 31.  Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. City of Seattle, No. C16-0322RSL, 2016 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 122723, at *11–12 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 9, 2016). 
 32.  City of Seattle, 890 F.3d at 779.  
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Id.
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antitrust claims remanded to the District Court are the sole focus of this 
Note.37
B. The Labor Exemption to the Sherman Antitrust Act 
Antitrust law aims to “enhance consumer welfare by ensuring that com-
petition regulates markets.”38 And the Sherman Antitrust Act of 189039 is 
premised on the idea that “the interaction of competitive forces will yield the 
best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest qual-
ity, and the greatest material progress . . . .”40 Section 1 of the Act prohibits 
contracts or agreements, which restrain trade or commerce, and Section 2 
prohibits monopolization in a particular industry.41
The federal courts initially viewed labor union activities as unlawful 
conspiracies to prevent trade and employed the Sherman Antitrust Act to 
issue injunctions against labor union activities.42 Employers frequently used 
injunctions to “stifl[e] labor disputes . . . [and] to defeat unions instantly by 
preventing them from using self-help and destroying the momentum of 
strikes before substantive legal rights were litigated.”43 Any collective activ-
ity of labor, whether a strike or a boycott, was commonly held to be an un-
lawful restraint of trade.44 As a result of the frequent injunctions against labor 
union activity,45 Congress passed the Clayton Antitrust Act in 191446 and the 
Norris-LaGuardia Act in 1932,47 which are commonly considered to be the 
sources of the statutory Labor Exemption.48 The Clayton Antitrust Act pro-
vided that antitrust law did not forbid labor unions from “lawfully carrying 
out . . . legitimate objects” and that labor unions were not “illegal combina-
tions or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws.”49 And the 
 37.  See id. at 795.  
 38.  Henry H. Perritt, Competitive Entertainment: Implications of the NFL Lockout Litigation for 
Sports, Theatre, Music, and Video Entertainment, 35 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 93, 127 (2012) (foot-
note omitted).  
 39.  Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2018)). 
 40.  Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958). 
 41.  Sherman Antitrust Act §§ 1-2.  
 42.  See Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274, 308–09 (1908) (holding that workers organizing together 
to pursue their interests was an unlawful restraint of trade), superseded by statute, Clayton Act, Pub. L. 
No. 63-212, 38 Stat. 730 (1914). 
 43.  Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters Local 174, 203 F.3d 703, 707 (9th Cir. 
2000) (en banc). 
 44.  Nat’l Woodwork Mfrs. Ass’n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 620 (1967).  
 45.  See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters Local 174, 203 F.3d at 707. 
 46.  15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (2018); 29 U.S.C. §§ 52-53 (2018). 
 47.  29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115. 
 48.  See Perritt, supra note 38, at 135–36.  
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Norris-LaGuardia Act prevented federal courts from issuing “any restraining 
order or temporary or permanent injunction . . . involving or growing out of 
a labor dispute.”50
Taken together, these Acts insulated “legitimate collective activity by 
employees . . . from the proscriptions of the antitrust laws.”51 One of these 
legitimate collective activities protected by the Labor Exemption is employ-
ees unilaterally organizing themselves into unions for the purposes of col-
lective bargaining.52 Subsequent federal legislation, such as the Railway 
Labor Act of 192653 and the National Labor Relations Act of 1935,54 legiti-
mized the statutory Labor Exemption by granting “broad rights to employees 
to engage in collective bargaining through representatives of their choice.”55
On its face, collective bargaining inherently limits competition because it 
seeks to create “private agreements to restrain competition in labor mar-
kets.”56 A simple example of such an agreement is one where a labor union 
and an employer agree to fix wages; or in other words, they agree to fix the 
price at which the workers will sell their labor to the employer. A slightly 
more complicated example is an agreement where the employer agrees to 
hire only workers and future workers from a particular labor union, creating 
a monopoly in the labor market by restricting the supply of labor and a mo-
nopsony in the labor market by restricting the demand for labor.57
Although the Sherman Antitrust Act intended to target agreements be-
tween businessmen in response to the anticompetitive and monopolistic tac-
tics of the era,58 the Supreme Court held that the statutory Labor Exemption 
did not exempt bilateral activity, such as “concerted action or agreements 
between unions and nonlabor parties.”59 In other words, “[w]hen labor un-
ions enter into agreements with others such as employers . . . they are outside 
the statutory [labor] exemption.”60 This was critical because an employer 
 50.  29 U.S.C. § 101 (§ 1 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70); see Milk Wagon Drivers’ Un-
ion, Local No. 753 v. Lake Valley Farm Prods., 311 U.S. 91, 101 (1940) (ruling that the Norris-LaGuardia 
Act intended to end the granting of injunctions “based upon complaints charging conspiracies to violate 
the Sherman Antitrust Act.”).  
 51.  Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 611 (8th Cir. 1976).  
 52.  See Perritt, supra note 38, at 136.  
 53.  45 U.S.C. § 152 (2018). 
 54.  29 U.S.C. § 157 (2018).  
 55.  Perritt, supra note 38, at 135. 
 56.  Id. at 132.  
 57.  Id.
 58.  Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 491–93 (1940). 
 59.  Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local No. 100, 421 U.S. 616, 622 (1975).  
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must be present at the bargaining table for collective bargaining to occur, and 
frequently, multi-employer bargains are sought by unions.61
The Supreme Court first addressed a restraint on competition imposed 
through collective bargaining in Allen Bradley Company v. Local Union No. 
3, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, where it held that a labor 
union’s agreements with all local electrical manufacturers and contractors 
“to eliminate all competition among themselves and to prevent all competi-
tion from others” in the relevant product market were not covered by the 
statutory Labor Exemption; and thus, the agreements violated the Sherman 
Antitrust Act.62 Twenty years later, the Court reached a similar conclusion 
in United Mine Workers v. Pennington where it held that a labor union’s 
agreement with several large coal operators, which ultimately aimed to elim-
inate smaller operators from the industry, was not covered by the statutory 
Labor Exemption because the agreement primarily affected the product mar-
ket.63
However, on the same day that the Supreme Court decided Pennington,
the Court also decided Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & 
Butcher Workmen v. Jewel Tea Company, where the Court set forth the non-
statutory Labor Exemption,64 which shields agreements between a labor un-
ion and a nonlabor party if the agreement is “intimately related to the union’s 
vital concerns of wages, hours, and working conditions.”65 As explained by 
the Supreme Court: 
The nonstatutory exemption has its source in the strong labor policy fa-
voring the association of employees to eliminate competition over wages 
and working conditions. Union success in organizing workers and stand-
ardizing wages ultimately will affect price competition among employers, 
but the goals of federal labor law never could be achieved if this effect on 
business competition were held a violation of the antitrust laws. The Court 
therefore has acknowledged that labor policy requires tolerance for less-
ening of business competition based on differences in wages and working 
conditions.66
In Jewel Tea Company, the Court held that the labor union was covered 
by the non-statutory Labor Exemption because its agreement covered only 
 61.  See NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 449, 353 U.S. 87, 89 (1957) (involving a multi-
employer collective bargaining agreement between a union and 8 employers in the linen supply business).  
 62.  325 U.S. 797, 809–10 (1945).  
 63.  381 U.S. 657, 663–66 (1965).  
 64.  381 U.S. 676, 689–90 (1965). 
 65.  H.A. Artists & Assocs. v. Actors’ Equity Ass’n, 451 U.S. 704, 716 n.19 (1981) (citation omit-
ted). 
 66.  Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616, 622 (1975) 
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marketing-hours restrictions in the labor market.67 Thus, courts have inter-
preted the Supreme Court’s precedent to suggest that collective bargaining 
agreements violate the Sherman Antitrust Act when the agreement reaches 
beyond the labor market and hurts the parties’ competitors by creating an 
anti-competitive effect in the product market.68
Historically, federal courts have applied the Labor Exemption only to 
agreements that involve workers who are statutorily labeled as “employ-
ees.”69 Courts reasoned that the Labor Exemption should only cover employ-
ees because “only employees were thought to need the protection from their 
employers . . . .”70 Independent contractors were considered to have more 
bargaining power than employees because “they were typically highly 
skilled workers who commanded premium wages on the open market and 
could provide their services to . . . customers on a project-by-project basis, 
rather than being tied to a single employer.”71 As a result, courts have gen-
erally held that independent contractors are not covered by the Labor Ex-
emption.72 While the view that only employees needed protection from their 
employers once held firm weight, the recent emergence of the gig economy 
has seriously called that view into question. 
C. The Current State of the Gig Economy and Ride-Hailing          
Companies 
The gig economy is “an economic system that uses online platforms to 
connect workers . . . with clients and consumers.”73 Typically, a business 
provides a platform through a smartphone application, which on-demand 
workers use to perform work on a free-lance basis for consumers.74 The con-
sumers “pay ‘piece-rate’ for the goods or services, and the online 
 67.  381 U.S. at 689–93.  
 68.  See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 50 F.3d 1041, 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1995).  
 69.  See Perritt, supra note 38, at 140.
 70.  Perritt, supra note 9, at 56–57. 
 71.  Michael L. Nadler, Independent Employees: A New Category of Workers for the Gig Economy,
19 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 443, 460 (2018).  
 72.  See Perritt, supra note 38, at 142; Taylor v. Local No. 7, Int’l Union of Journeymen Horsesho-
ers, 353 F.2d 593, 606 (4th Cir. 1965) (en banc) (holding that the respondents’ activity was not protected 
by the Labor Exemption because they were independent contractors). But see Am. Fed. of Musicians v. 
Carroll, 391 U.S. 99, 106 (1968) (quoting Carroll v. Am. Fed. of Musicians, 241 F. Supp. 865, 887 
(S.D.N.Y. 1965)) (holding that the non-statutory Labor Exemption applied to a group of orchestra leaders 
because they were a “‘labor group’ and party to a labor dispute under the Norris-LaGuardia Act” although 
they were independent contractors).  
 73.  Kennedy, supra note 1, at 992.  
 74.  James de Haan, The Über-Union: Re-Thinking Collective Bargaining for the Gig Economy, 12 
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intermediary takes a fee for facilitating the transaction.”75 Given the conven-
ience and flexibility provided by these platforms, nearly half of adults in the 
United States have participated in the gig economy, either as consumers or 
as on-demand workers.76 As a result, business is booming in the gig econ-
omy.77
While companies such as Handy, Airbnb, and Postmates are well-
known, “[t]he most widely recognized [gig] economy companies are ‘ride 
[hailing]’ companies, such as Uber and Lyft.”78 For example, consumers use 
the Uber app or the Lyft app to request a ride.79 Then, the app matches the 
consumer with an on-demand driver based on location, “uses a pricing algo-
rithm to set [a] fare for [the] ride,” and provides a way for the consumer to 
pay the on-demand driver.80 The platform navigates the on-demand driver to 
the consumer’s pick up location;81 then, the on-demand driver drives the in-
dividual to her or his destination, and upon completion of the ride, the con-
sumer pays the on-demand driver through the app.82 The ride-hailing 
company receives a percentage of the on-demand driver’s compensation for 
the ride, which is a software licensing fee for using the ride-hailing com-
pany’s platform.83 Also, ride-hailing companies use “surge pricing,” which 
increases a ride’s fare due to a higher supply of consumers than on-demand 
drivers in a given area, as well as other factors, such as distance, weather, 
and time.84 Lastly, most, if not all, ride-hailing companies allow on-demand 
drivers to drive for other ride-hailing companies’ platforms.85
Central to the business model of ride-hailing companies “is the charac-
terization of its workforce as ‘independent contractors,’ rather than employ-
ees.”86 And by the business model’s inherent design, the self-determining 
schedules of on-demand drivers makes it difficult for them to come together 
 75.  Kennedy, supra note 1, at 992. 
 76.  See Steinmetz, supra note 7 (“44% of U.S. adults have participated in such transactions, playing 
the roles of lenders and borrowers, drivers and riders, hosts and guests.”).  
 77.  See Brett Harris, Uber, Lyft, and Regulating the Sharing Economy, 41 SEATTLE U. L. Rev. 269, 
271 (2017) (“In 2013, the [gig economy] was valued at $26 billion.”).  
 78.  Id.
 79.  Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. City of Seattle, 890 F.3d 769, 776 (9th Cir. 
2018).  
 80.  Sanjukta M. Paul, Uber as For-Profit Hiring Hall: A Price-Fixing Paradox and its Implica-
tions, 38 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 233, 237 (2017).  
 81.  Perritt, supra note 9, at 59–60. 
 82.  City of Seattle, 890 F.3d at 776.  
 83.  Paul, supra note 80, at 237.  
 84.  Perritt, supra note 9, at 60–61.  
 85.  City of Seattle, 890 F.3d at 776. 
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to take collective action.87 Not surprisingly, on-demand drivers do not fit the 
traditional labor-law categories. Thus, on-demand drivers do not have a “rec-
ognized [federal] legal right to bargain collectively with their employers in 
regard to the terms and conditions of their employment.”88 But given the 
growth of the gig economy, American labor law can no longer turn a blind 
eye to the disparities in bargaining power between traditional employees and 
a growing number of on-demand drivers in the gig economy. 
II. THE LABOR EXEMPTION TO THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT EXEMPTS 
THE SEATTLE ORDINANCE FROM ANTITRUST LIABILITY.
A. The Problem with the Employee - Independent Contractor  
Distinction 
Recognizing that employees have the federal right to bargain collec-
tively, while independent contractors do not, some have proposed that Con-
gress or the courts should consider certain factors, such as working hours 
and economic dependence, as a means to categorize independent contractors 
– specifically, on-demand drivers – as employees, which would secure them 
the federal right to collective bargaining.89 But any approach that seeks to 
categorize on-demand drivers within the same legal category as employees 
is misguided for several reasons. 
First, on-demand drivers’ relationship with a ride-hailing company’s 
platform is fundamentally different from the relationship that a traditional 
employee has with an employer.90 The law recognizes a traditional em-
ployer-employee relationship when the employer maintains control over an 
employee in regard to the employee’s wages, hours, working conditions, and 
duties or tasks.91 Meanwhile, ride-hailing companies “rely on new business 
models that thrive on fluid part-time work relationships, rather than tradi-
tional employment with employer-controlled work schedules and hours.”92
Second, given the different relationship structures in which on-demand 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Iglitzin & Robbins, supra note 2, at 50.  
 89.  See Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1081–82 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (“Perhaps Lyft drivers 
who work more than a certain number of hours should be employees while the others should be inde-
pendent contractors.”); Alex Kirven, Whose Gig is it Anyway? Technological Change, Workplace Control 
and Supervision, and Workers’ Rights in the Gig Economy, 89 U. COLO. L. REV. 249, 289 (2018) (arguing 
that on-demand drivers should be classified as employees because they provide a service that ride-hailing 
companies are economically dependent on). 
 90.  Perritt, supra note 9, at 55.  
 91.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07 (AM. LAW INST. 2006). 
 92.  Marina Lao, Workers in the “Gig” Economy: The Case for Extending the Antitrust Labor Ex-
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drivers and employees provide their labor, categorizing on-demand drivers 
as employees “would require fundamental structural changes” to ride-hailing 
companies’ business models, which would severely diminish the flexibility 
for workers that made the ride-hailing companies’ business model attractive 
to begin with.93 Also, such changes could greatly reduce the efficiency of a 
ride-hailing company’s platform to connect on-demand drivers with con-
sumers.94
Third, such fundamental structural changes would “produce inefficient 
outcomes and . . . undermine efficient and equitable distribution of re-
sources.”95 If a ride-hailing company has to maintain an employer-employee 
relationship with each on-demand driver, managing the platform would in-
crease administrative costs and cause logistical issues.96 As a result, ride-
hailing companies would likely terminate on-demand drivers whose working 
hours are low or inconsistent in order to save costs.97 Another undesirable 
consequence of maintaining such an employer-employee relationship is that 
on-demand drivers would not be able to work for multiple platforms because 
a ride-hailing company, as an employer, would expect an on-demand driver, 
as an employee, to not work for a competitor; and this would ultimately re-
duce competition between the platforms and could lead to a single platform 
dominating the market.98 Thus, on-demand drivers should not be classified 
as employees because “[t]hey do not satisfy the traditional legal criteria for 
that status”99 and because of the negative economic consequences that would 
arise from such a classification. Instead of categorizing on-demand drivers 
as employees in order to cover them under the Labor Exemption, I argue the 
inverse: The Labor Exemption covers labor markets, including Seattle’s on-
demand driver labor market at issue here. 
 93.  Id.; see Perritt, supra note 9, at 123 (“Classification of ride-hailing drivers as employees would 
subject them to all of the traditional types of labor and employment protection, forcing a considerable 
modification of existing practices.”).  
 94.  See Lao, supra note 92, at 1574.  
 95.  Perritt, supra note 9, at 55; see Harris & Krueger, supra note 5, at 8 (“Forcing these new forms 
of work into a traditional employment relationship could be an existential threat to the emergence of 
online-intermediated work, with adverse consequences for workers, consumers, businesses, and the econ-
omy.”).  
 96.  Lao, supra note 92, at 1578.  
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Id. at 1580.  
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B. The Labor Exemption applies because it covers particular labor 
markets, including the labor market for on-demand drivers 
Although such a broad interpretation of the Labor Exemption may ap-
pear unorthodox at first, the interpretation finds support in a variety of 
sources. First, it draws support from the text of the statutes underlying the 
Labor Exemption. Second, the interpretation attracts support from the Labor 
Exemption’s purpose to help workers improve the conditions of their labor 
through collective bargaining,100 especially when considering the current 
conditions of the labor market for on-demand drivers. And third, the inter-
pretation is strengthened by the Supreme Court’s precedent in Labor Exemp-
tion cases, which has suggested that the Exemption covers labor agreements 
and disputes that involve more than just employees. 
1. The Text of the Clayton Act and the Norris-LaGuardia Act 
The Labor Exemption “traces its origin to sections 6 and 20 of the Clay-
ton Act . . . and to the Norris-LaGuardia Act.”101 Beginning with the Clayton 
Act, section 6 states: 
The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce.
Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the 
existence and operation of labor . . . organizations, instituted for the pur-
poses of mutual help . . . or to forbid or restrain individual members of 
such organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects 
thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the members thereof, be held or 
construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, 
under the antitrust laws.102
When looking closely at the text of Section 6, it does not mention “em-
ployees,” nor does it imply that only employees’ or specific types of work-
ers’ organizations and activities are exempted from antitrust liability. 
Instead, Section 6 stresses the word “labor.” When the Clayton Act was 
passed in 1914, Webster’s Dictionary defined labor as “[p]hysical toil or 
bodily exertion . . . [or] intellectual exertion; mental effort . . . directed to 
some useful end.”103 Today, Webster’s Dictionary defines labor as 
 100.  See Paul, supra note 80, at 235 (“[T]he [L]abor [E]xemption . . . creates the space for affirma-
tive protections of collective bargaining by workers with their employers over wages and working con-
ditions.”).  
 101.  Brown v. Pro Football, 50 F.3d 1041, 1048 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (citations omitted).  
 102.  15 U.S.C. § 17 (2018) (§ 6 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731) (emphasis added).  
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“expenditure of physical or mental effort” and notes that the physical or men-
tal effort “provides . . . goods or services in an economy.”104
With either definition, the emphasis is on the worker’s activity and the 
beneficial end result of that activity. Neither definition suggests that the 
worker’s activity is controlled by an employer nor do they suggest that the 
beneficial end result must work to the benefit of an employer; thus, there is 
no implication of the traditional employer-employee relationship within the 
definition of labor. Also, because Section 6 excludes defining labor as a com-
modity or article of commerce, which is bought and sold in a product market, 
and because Section 6 concerns antitrust laws, which cover markets, it fol-
lows that Section 6 speaks only to labor markets. While Section 20 of the 
Clayton Act does refer to “employees” in regard to limiting the authority of 
federal courts to issue injunctions against labor union activities,105 Sections 
1 and 2 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which also limit federal courts’ author-
ity for issuing injunctions against labor union activities, does not refer to 
“employees.”106 Instead, Section 1 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act emphasizes 
that injunctions may not be issued “in a case involving or growing out of a 
labor dispute.”107 And Section 13 of the Act defines “labor dispute” as “any 
controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment, or concerning 
the association or representation of persons in negotiating . . . terms or con-
ditions of employment, regardless of whether or not disputants stand in prox-
imate relation of employer and employee.”108
Thus, the Act clarifies that a labor dispute can arise in contexts outside 
of the traditional employer-employee relationship. Indeed, the Supreme 
Court clarified that a “labor dispute” can arise out of a labor union’s activity 
“directed at the primary employer or at neutral ‘secondary’ employers,” i.e., 
third parties.109 And the Court further iterated that “the term ‘labor dispute’ 
must not be narrowly construed because the statutory definition itself is ex-
tremely broad.”110 All things considered, the text of the Clayton Act and the 
Norris-LaGuardia Act suggest that the Labor Exemption covers more than 
 104.  Labor, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY (2019), https://www.merriam-web-
ster.com/dictionary/labor (Jan. 6, 2019) [https://perma.cc/7ZE9-2564].  
 105.  29 U.S.C. § 52 (§ 20 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 738).  
 106.  29 U.S.C. §§ 101-02 (2018) (§§ 1-2 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70). 
 107.  29 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added).  
 108.  29 U.S.C. § 113(c) (2018) (§ 13 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70) (emphasis added).  
 109.  Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Maint. of Way Emps., 481 U.S. 429, 438 (1987); see United 
States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 231 (1941) (stating that the Norris-LaGuardia Act “established that 
the allowable area of union activity was not to be restricted . . . to an immediate employer-employee 
relation.”).  
 110.  Jacksonville Bulk Terminals v. Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, 457 U.S. 702, 712 (1982) (em-
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just statutorily-labeled employees and instead, can cover a particular labor 
market. 
2. The Purpose of the Labor Exemption & the On-Demand Driver  
Labor Market 
The Clayton Act protects labor groups from antitrust liability when 
those groups’ activities aim to improve workers’ wages and working condi-
tions.111 And Section 2 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act builds on this purpose 
as it states: 
Whereas under prevailing economic conditions . . . the individual unor-
ganized worker is commonly helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract 
and to protect his freedom of labor, and thereby to obtain acceptable terms 
and conditions of employment . . . it is necessary that he have full freedom 
of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of his 
own choosing, to negotiate the terms and conditions of his employment.112
The Supreme Court explained that the Act aimed “to restore the broad 
purpose which Congress thought it had formulated in the Clayton Act.”113
And that broad purpose was to protect labor union collective bargaining ac-
tivities—centered on improving workers’ wages and conditions—beyond 
the context of an employer-employee relationship.114
When considering the exchange of labor by an on-demand driver in re-
turn for payment by a consumer and the ride-hailing company receiving a 
percentage of that payment, “[o]ne can plausibly argue that [it is the] kind of 
exchange . . . within the scope of Norris-LaGuardia and is clearly what the 
statute meant to protect.”115 And when more specifically considering the cur-
rent conditions of the labor market for on-demand drivers, their exclusion 
from the federal right to bargain collectively “has perpetuated an imbalance 
of economic bargaining power that labor and employment laws were in-
tended to redress.”116 This imbalance of bargaining power has crippled the 
on-demand driver labor market in several ways. 
First, on-demand drivers “typically experience high levels of income 
volatility” because most on-demand drivers are young adults and low-in-
come individuals.117 Typically, federal labor policy in the United States has 
sought to aid such workers in their pursuit of higher wages and better 
 111.  Iglitzin & Robbins, supra note 2, at 57.  
 112.  29 U.S.C. § 102 (2018) (§ 2 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70). 
 113.  Hutcheson, 312 U.S. at 235–36.  
 114.  See id. at 229–31.  
 115.  Perritt, supra note 9, at 144.  
 116.  Kennedy, supra note 1, at 1002.  
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working conditions, given that they may “lack the education, skills, and other 
economic leverage” to negotiate for better terms and conditions of their la-
bor.118 Yet on-demand drivers’ wage insecurity has grown in the gig econ-
omy,119 as many on-demand drivers have experienced wrongful deductions 
from their pay.120 But under the Seattle Ordinance, on-demand drivers could 
bargain collectively over wrongful compensation deductions, as well as 
other payment-related issues, which would ultimately provide on-demand 
drivers with better wage security.121
Second, many on-demand drivers are turning to ride-hailing companies 
as their primary source of income, but their wages are still low despite the 
fact that some on-demand drivers are working more than forty hours a 
week.122 This is not surprising given that on-demand drivers’ costs include 
“the time lost waiting for and picking up a [consumer], vehicle maintenance 
costs, insurance fees, and gas expenses.”123 Lastly, because their wages are 
usually low, on-demand drivers may have to rely on government assistance 
more frequently, which has negative consequences for taxpayers and gov-
ernment budgeting.124
However, by providing on-demand drivers with a way to bargain col-
lectively, like the Seattle Ordinance has set out to do, it would “give[] them 
a sense of empowerment and even[] out the balance of power” between on-
demand drivers and ride-hailing companies.125 Indeed, the primary sponsor 
of the Seattle Ordinance, Mike O’Brien, stated that the Ordinance intended 
“to give drivers ‘a voice’ on the job” after he “witness[ed] how little power 
drivers themselves had in working for a living wage.”126 Therefore, given 
that the Labor Exemption’s broad purpose is to protect workers who seek to 
improve their wages and working conditions within a particular labor mar-
ket, and because Seattle’s Ordinance provides a framework for on-demand 
drivers to address economic disparities through collective bargaining, it is 
 118.  Id.
 119.  Id. at 994.  
 120.  Perritt, supra note 9, at 129.  
 121.  See id. at 136–38.  
 122.  See Steinmetz, supra note 7 (noting that some on-demand drivers “use the platform 50 hours a 
week to feed themselves.”); Harris, supra note 77, at 272 (observing that on-demand drivers “must put in 
long hours that extend beyond the standard eight-hour workday in order to make a sufficient amount of 
money.”).  
 123.  Harris, supra note 77, at 272.  
 124.  See Kennedy, supra note 1, at 1001.  
 125.  Perritt, supra note 9, at 137. 
 126.  Katy Steinmetz, California Bill Would Allow Uber, Lyft Drivers to Negotiate as a Group, TIME 
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likely that Congress intended the Labor Exemption to cover such pro-
posals.127
3. The Supreme Court’s precedent suggests a broad interpretation of 
the Labor Exemption. 
The Supreme Court’s earlier Labor Exemption cases furthered the view 
that the Exemption only applied to employees,128 but these cases have been 
overblown and misunderstood. For example, in Columbia River Packers As-
sociation v. Hinton, which involved a buyer that processed and sold canned 
fish and seller that was a fishermen’s union of independent fishermen who 
caught and sold the fish to the buyer, the Court held that the Labor Exemp-
tion did not apply because the dispute between the parties was a dispute be-
tween businessmen and not a labor dispute between an employer and an 
employee.129 But Hinton embraced a narrow definition of “labor dispute” 
that the Court would later reject.130 And recent decisions by the Supreme 
Court, as well as the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals and District Courts, 
suggest that “[e]nough ambiguity and flexibility exists in [the] case law on 
the [L]abor [E]xemption to allow them to be molded around the conditions 
of [a] particular labor market[].”131
One lines of cases has extended the Labor Exemption to workers who 
were acting as independent contractors and employees simultaneously. For 
example, in a labor market of milk drivers, a dispute arose between a labor 
union of milk wagon drivers and a group of milk vendors who were acting 
as independent contractors in nature although they were labeled as employ-
ees in their agreement with the Plaintiff.132 The milk vendors’ activity had 
led to a decrease in the union workers’ employment.133 The Supreme Court 
held that the Labor Exemption applied because a labor dispute existed, as 
“all the parties had direct or indirect interests in production, sale, and distri-
bution of milk.”134 In another instance, the Court held that a labor organiza-
tion was covered by the Labor Exemption when it negotiated a minimum 
rental price for motor carriers who operated as independent contractors be-
cause they owned and drove their own vehicles.135 The Court’s reasoning for 
 127.  See Kennedy, supra note 1, at 1013–14.  
 128.  See generally Perritt, supra note 9, at 143–44.  
 129.  315 U.S. 143, 144, 146–47 (1942).  
 130.  See Jacksonville Bulk Terminals v. Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, 457 U.S. 702, 712 (1982).  
 131.  Perritt, supra note 9, at 149. 
 132.  Milk Wagon Drivers’ Union v. Lake Valley Farm Prod., Inc., 311 U.S. 91, 94–96, 98 (1940).  
 133.  Id. at 95. 
 134.  Id. at 93, 103. 
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applying the Labor Exemption rested on the fact that the agreement was cor-
recting an abuse that had been occurring in the particular labor market.136
Another line of cases applied the Labor Exemption to workers who 
were independent contractors because “there was ‘the presence of a job or 
wage competition or some other economic interrelationship affecting legiti-
mate union interests between the union members and the independent con-
tractors,’” thus, making them parties to a labor dispute.137 For example, in 
H.A. Artists & Associates v. Actors’ Equity Association, the Supreme Court 
held that a group of independent agents for stage actors and actresses were a 
labor group, and that it was in a labor dispute with a labor union of agents 
who also worked for stage actors and actresses, as both parties provided the 
same type of services.138
Both lines of cases ultimately suggest that the Labor Exemption, when 
broadly defined, covers labor markets because the Court’s reasoning for ap-
plying the Exemption usually rests on a dispute’s or an agreement’s effect 
on a particular labor market. Given that on-demand drivers provide the same 
labor and compete for the same wages as taxi drivers do, as well as the fact 
that taxi drivers are statutorily-labeled employees,139 the Supreme Court’s 
precedent suggests that the Labor Exemption would extend to a dispute in 
the particular labor market that includes on-demand drivers or a collective 
bargaining agreement under the Seattle Ordinance. 
C. The Labor Exemption extends to the on-demand drivers under the 
Seattle Ordinance. 
Because the Labor Exemption broadly extends to cover particular labor 
markets and not just employees, whether it covers the on-demand drivers 
under the Seattle Ordinance “turns on whether the relevant federal labor pol-
icy is deserving of pre-eminence over federal antitrust policy under the cir-
cumstances of the particular case.”140 Given that the Seattle Ordinance 
provides a framework for on-demand drivers to restrain competition through 
wage fixing agreements with ride-hailing companies, it “embodies the inher-
ent tension between antitrust policy, which is designed to maximize . . . 
 136.  Id. at 293–94.  
 137.  Am. Fed. of Musicians v. Carroll, 391 U.S. 99, 105–06 (1968) (quoting Carroll v. Am. Fed. of 
Musicians, 241 F. Supp. 865, 887 (S.D.N.Y. 1965)).  
 138.  451 U.S. 704, 706, 721 (1981). But see L.A. Meat & Provision Drivers Union v. United States, 
371 U.S. 94, 98 (1962) (holding that the Labor Exemption did not apply to a group of independent con-
tractors when “[t]here was no showing of any actual or potential wage or job competition, or of any other 
economic interrelationship, between the [independent contractors] and the . . . members of the union.”).  
 139.  See Checker Taxi Co., Inc., v. Nat’l Prod. Workers Union, 113 F.R.D. 561, 562 (N.D. Ill. 1986). 
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competition, and national labor policy, which is designed to promote coop-
eration between workers in the face of employer economic power.”141
In Mackey v. NFL, the Eighth Circuit set forth a three-prong test for 
determining whether the non-statutory Labor Exemption applies,142 and alt-
hough not every Circuit has adopted the Mackey test,143 it has been adopted 
by the Sixth and Ninth Circuits,144 as well as by District Courts in the Third 
Circuit and the District of Columbia.145 Under the Mackey test, the non-stat-
utory Labor Exemption applies when “[1] the restraint on trade primarily 
affects only the parties to the collective bargaining relationship . . . [2] where 
the agreement sought to be exempted concerns a mandatory subject of col-
lective bargaining [and] . . . [3] where the agreement sought to be exempted 
is the product of bona fide arm’s-length bargaining.”146
Under the Seattle Ordinance, a collective bargaining agreement would 
primarily affect the on-demand drivers for whom the agreement was negoti-
ated and the ride-hailing company for whom the on-demand drivers provide 
their labor. The Ordinance expresses that permissible subjects of negotia-
tions are “the nature and amount of payments to be made by, or withheld 
from, the [ride-hailing company] to or by the [on-demand] drivers . . . [and] 
conditions of work,”147 which aligns with the Supreme Court’s emphasis that 
the non-statutory Labor Exemption applies to agreements “over wages and 
working conditions.”148 Also, the Ordinance expresses that the representa-
tive and the ride-hailing company are the only parties to the collective bar-
gaining relationship.149
Turning to the second prong, whether an agreement concerns a manda-
tory subject depends “not [on] the form of the agreement—e. g., prices or 
wages—but [on] its relative impact on the product market and the interests 
of union members.”150 Similarly to Oliver, any agreement arising out of the 
 141.  Kennedy, supra note 1, at 1022.  
 142.  543 F.2d at 614.  
 143.  See Clarett v. NFL, 369 F.3d 124, 133–34 (2d Cir. 2004).  
 144.  See In re Detroit Auto Dealers Ass’n, 955 F.2d 457, 463 (6th Cir. 1992); Cont’l Mar. of S.F., 
Inc. v. Pac. Coast Metal Trades Dist. Council, 817 F.2d 1391, 1393 (9th Cir. 1987). 
 145.  See Bridgeman v. Nat’l Basketball Asso., 675 F. Supp. 960, 964 (D.N.J. 1987); Zimmerman v. 
Nat’l Football League, 632 F. Supp. 398, 403–04 (D.D.C. 1986).  
 146.  Mackey, 543 F.2d at 614 (citations omitted).  
 147.  SEATTLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE § 6.310.735(H)(1) (2015). 
 148.  Connell Constr. Co., Inc. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local No. 100, 421 U.S. 616, 622 (1975). 
 149.  § 6.310.735(H)(1); see Brown v. Pro Football, 50 F.3d 1041, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1995) 
(“[R]estraints on competition lawfully imposed through the collective bargaining process are exempted 
from antitrust liability so long as such restraints primarily affect only the labor market organized around 
the collective bargaining relationship.”).  
 150.  Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Jewel Tea Co., Inc., 
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collective bargaining process under the Seattle Ordinance would largely af-
fect only the labor market and not the product market.151 Any minimal effects 
on the product market are more extensively discussed infra in Section 
III.B.3. And in regard to the interests of on-demand drivers, “the growth of 
the gig economy has created a critical demand for better wages and working 
conditions,”152 which on-demand drivers could collectively bargain for, 
given that the Ordinance expressly permits it. Hence, the Ordinance ad-
vances the goals of federal labor law, which seeks to alleviate economic in-
equality, and the goals of antitrust laws, which seeks to protect consumers.153
Finally, under the Ordinance’s framework, any agreement that would 
arise between the on-demand drivers and the ride-hailing company would be 
a product of bona fide arm’s-length bargaining. The Ordinance explicitly au-
thorizes the representative and the ride-hailing company to “meet and nego-
tiate in good faith.”154 And the Ordinance’s framework correlates with the 
congressional policy favoring collective bargaining, which rejects “anti-
competitive agreements imposed unilaterally by one party, usually manage-
ment, without regard to the interests of the other [party].”155 Given that each 
prong of the Mackey test is satisfied by the Seattle Ordinance’s framework, 
the non-statutory Labor Exemption would apply to an agreement collectively 
bargained for by the representative and the ride-hailing company. 
III. THE SEATTLE ORDINANCE IS EXEMPTED FROM ANTITRUST 
LIABILITY UNDER THE RULE OF REASON.
A. The Seattle Ordinance should be analyzed by the Rule of Reason 
because the Ordinance is not per se unreasonable. 
The Sherman Antitrust Act prohibits “[e]very contract, combination in 
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or com-
merce among the several States.”156 Because the Supreme Court interpreted 
“restraint of trade” to mean an “undue restraint,”157 it concluded that “Con-
gress intended to outlaw only unrestrainable restraints [of trade].”158 There-
fore, in order to determine whether an agreement violates the Sherman 
Antitrust Act, courts first consider whether the agreement imposes a restraint 
 151.  See Local 24, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283, 294 (1959). 
 152.  Kennedy, supra note 1, at 1002.  
 153.  See id. at 1036.  
 154.  § 6.310.735(H)(1). 
 155.  Zimmerman v. Nat’l Football League, 632 F. Supp. 398, 406 (D.D.C. 1986). 
 156.  15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018). 
 157.  Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59–60 (1911). 
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that is per se unreasonable; and if the agreement does not impose a restraint 
that is per se unreasonable, courts then determine whether the agreement un-
reasonably restrains trade under the Rule of Reason.159
Restraints are per se unreasonable when they concern “naked price fix-
ing or output restrictions.”160 Also, “[t]ypically only ‘horizonal’ restraints—
restraints ‘imposed by agreement between competitors’—qualify as unrea-
sonable per se.”161 For example, where two providers of bar review courses 
agreed to share revenue, not to compete with one another in certain territo-
ries, and then raised the price of their courses to consumers, the Supreme 
Court held that the arrangement was a per se violation of the Sherman Act.162
In another instance, where a local grocery association restricted its members 
from selling products in territories outside of each members’ exclusively li-
censed territory, the arrangement qualified as unreasonable per se.163
Turning to the Seattle Ordinance, because the City of Seattle has agreed 
to not enforce the Ordinance while the District Court hears arguments re-
garding the federal antitrust claims, there has not been any collectively bar-
gained for agreements between a representative and a ride-hailing company 
in Seattle.164 So, for the purposes of Part III, I analyze a hypothetical agree-
ment (“the collective agreement”) between a representative and a ride-hail-
ing company, in which on-demand drivers earn a larger percentage of the 
wage that they receive from each ride. Given that “[a] substantial portion of 
the complaints by Uber drivers relate[] to perceived inadequacy of compen-
sation,”165 I presume that increasing the percentage that the on-demand driv-
ers retain from each ride’s cost will be the most pressing topic of negotiation 
for the representative. 
At first glance, aside from the vertical agreement between the repre-
sentative and the ride-hailing company, the collective agreement includes a 
horizontal agreement (“the horizontal agreement”) among the on-demand 
drivers to fix the percentage that they retain for each ride’s cost. Because the 
on-demand drivers, as independent contractors, are not statutorily-labeled 
employees, they are outside the scope of the Labor Exemption, as it is 
 159.  Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978). 
 160.  Perritt, supra note 38, at 128.  
 161.  Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2283–84 (2018) (citing Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp 
Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 730 (1988)).  
 162.  Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 47–50 (1990).  
 163.  United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 602–03, 608 (1972).  
 164.  Dep’t of Fin. & Admin. Servs., For-Hire Driver Collective Bargaining, SEATTLE.GOV,
https://www.seattle.gov/business-regulations/taxis-for-hires-and-tncs/for-hire-driver-collective-bargain-
ing [http://perma.cc/DN2A-SFK].  





      06/12/2020   13:18:38
42394-ckt_95-1 Sheet No. 165 Side A      06/12/2020   13:18:38
12 ALEKNAVICUS MACRO 1 EIC 5.4 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/8/2020 11:26 PM 
2020] ON-DEMAND DRIVERS AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 321 
currently understood.166 As a result, on-demand drivers can be characterized 
as competitors in the labor market, competing with each other for the rides.167
And the horizontal agreement would be characterized as stifling such com-
petition among the on-demand drivers. Thus, the horizontal agreement be-
tween on-demand drivers under the collective agreement seems to be the 
type of anti-competitive agreement that the Supreme Court has traditionally 
held to be per se unlawful.168 However, characterizing the entire collective 
agreement as per se unreasonable solely because the horizontal agreement is 
present is inappropriate for the following reasons. 
First, the Supreme Court directs the per se rule against horizontal agree-
ments among individuals who are not statutorily-labeled employees because 
such agreements “abolish[] all competition between the parties” in the labor 
market at issue.169 But in the on-demand driver labor market presently, the 
ride-hailing companies set the percentage that they retain from the on-de-
mand drivers in regard to each ride’s cost,170 preventing any competition be-
tween the drivers.171 Unlike competitors in a particular market, on-demand 
drivers “providing service on a platform are generally not independent busi-
nesses in competition with each other.”172 Thus, it would serve no purpose 
to employ the per se rule to the collective agreement because the horizontal 
agreement would not create the unlawful activity of eliminating price com-
petition, as there is not any wage competition among on-demand drivers in 
the on-demand driver labor market currently.173
Second, the Supreme Court has forgone applying the per se rule against 
a horizontal agreement when the agreement was essential for a product to be 
provided.174 For example, where member institutions of the NCAA created 
a horizontal agreement among themselves, in which they “place[d] a ceiling 
on the number of games [that] member institutions [could] televise,” the 
 166.  See Paul, supra note 80, at 234–36.
 167.  Mark Anderson & Max Huffman, The Sharing Economy Meets the Sherman Act: Is Uber a 
Firm, a Cartel, or Something in Between?, 2017 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 859, 908 (2018). 
 168.  See Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886 (2007) (citation omitted) 
(“Restraints that are per se unlawful include horizontal agreements among competitors to fix 
prices . . . .”); Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 6 (2006) (citation omitted) (“Price-fixing agreements 
between two or more competitors, otherwise known as horizontal price-fixing agreements, fall into the 
category of arrangements that are per se unlawful.”). 
 169.  Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 240 (1899). 
 170.  See Perritt, supra note 9, at 72. 
 171.  Lao, supra note 92, at 1568. 
 172.  Id. at 1566. 
 173.  See Wilson v. Mobil Oil Corp., 940 F. Supp. 944, 954 (E.D. La. 1996) (Ruling that an agree-
ment was not per se unreasonable because the agreement did “not eliminate price competition . . . because 
there was no competition between [the parties] to eliminate.”). 
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Supreme Court did not apply the per se rule because horizontal agreements 
between the institutions, such as the extensive rules that apply to all NCAA 
athletes, were necessary in order to provide college sporting events for con-
sumers.175 And here, “at least some form of horizontal cooperation is neces-
sary for the ride service to be offered to consumers through [a ride-hailing 
company’s] app.”176 While many ride-hailing companies have characterized 
themselves as technology companies, “the technological platform itself is 
valueless without the labor powering its application.”177 Given that ride-hail-
ing companies “depend[] almost entirely upon the efficiency with which 
[their platforms] extract labor from the workers who provide the [on-demand 
rides],”178 the necessary relationship between the on-demand drivers and the 
platform suggests that it would be inappropriate to immediately characterize 
the collective agreement as per se unreasonable. 
Third, the Supreme Court has applied the per se rule to horizontal agree-
ments that restrict output.179 But here, the collective agreement is unlikely to 
substantially restrict output because even a slightly minor increase in the 
price of rides would not disincentive consumers from using a ride-hailing 
company’s service,180 given the convenience of on-demand rides and con-
sumers’ high demand for them.181 Even if the collective agreement results in 
some output restrictions, the Rule of Reason would more carefully consider 
the output restrictions’ anti-competitive effects in the on-demand driver la-
bor market, as well as the product market. Thus, output ’restrictions antici-
pated anti-competitive effects are more extensively discussed infra in 
Section III.B.3. 
Lastly, the Supreme Court has hesitated in applying the per se rule to 
horizontal agreements that are uniquely different from the typical price-fix-
ing horizontal agreements that are considered per se unreasonable.182 The 
 175.  Id. at 99, 101.  
 176.  Anderson & Huffman, supra note 167, at 910.  
 177.  Kennedy, supra note 1, at 993. 
 178.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 179.  Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 100. 
 180.  See Lao, supra note 92, at 1571 (arguing that the relatively inelastic demand for on-demand 
rides would not be significantly affected by a collective bargaining agreement by on-demand drivers and 
noting that such an agreement would not lead to a substantial increase in the price of rides).
 181.  See Mansoor Iqbal, Uber Revenue and Usage Statistics, BUSINESS OF APPS (Nov. 28, 2018), 
http://www.businessofapps.com/data/uber-statistics/ (“As of August 2018, 436,000 Uber rides took place 
per day, compared to 275,000 taxi rides, and 122,000 Lyft rides.”).  
 182.  Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 100–01 (1984); see, e.g., United States v. Capitol Serv., Inc., 756 
F.2d 502, 506 n.1 (7th Cir. 1985) (noting how the Supreme Court did not apply the per se rule to a 
horizontal agreement because “the unique circumstances . . . called for the application of the Rule of 
Reason rather than the per se rule.”); R.C. Dick Geothermal Corp. v. Thermogenics, Inc., 890 F.2d 139, 
163 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (Norris, J., dissenting) (“The Supreme Court has been reluctant to treat 
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per se rule is “invoked when surrounding circumstances make the likelihood 
of anticompetitive so great as to rend unjustified further examination of the 
challenged conduct.”183 But here, because the gig economy has created new 
and unique relationships between laborers and on-demand companies and 
because the Seattle Ordinance is the first of its kind,184 the collective agree-
ment is precisely the type of novel and unfamiliar arrangement that requires 
further inquiry under the Rule of Reason. 
In addition to why the per se rule should not be applied, one reason for 
applying the Rule of Reason is that ride-hailing companies’ platforms are 
two-sided platforms,185 and the Supreme Court has analyzed such platforms 
under the Rule of Reason.186 To clarify, a ride-hailing company’s platform 
is two-sided because it transacts with on-demand drivers in the labor market 
who are looking for a platform as a means to perform labor and the platform 
simultaneously transacts with consumers in the product market who are 
looking for on-demand rides. Given that two-sided platforms are relatively 
complex, the Rule of Reason should be employed to fully analyze the col-
lective agreement’s effects on competition in the on-demand driver labor 
market. 
B. Applying the Rule of Reason to the Seattle Ordinance 
Under the Rule of Reason, “courts . . . conduct a fact-specific assess-
ment of ‘market power and market structure . . . to assess the [restraint]’s 
actual effect’ on competition.”187 Additionally, courts “tak[e] into account a 
variety of factors, including specific information about the relevant business, 
its conditions before and after the restraint was imposed, and the restraint’s 
history, nature, or effect.”188 If a court finds that the agreement imposes a 
restraint that has a legitimate business purpose and promotes competition, 
“the court must then balance the ‘anticompetitive [effects]’ of the challenged 
restraint against its ‘procompetitive [effects].’”189 If the anti-competitive ef-
fects outweigh the pro-competitive effects, then the restraint is unlawful 
823 F.3d 759, 771 (2d Cir. 2016) (citation omitted) (“The unfamiliar context of appellants’ horizontal 
price-fixing claims provides no basis to disturb application of the per se rule.”). 
 183.  Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 at 103–04 (footnote omitted). 
 184.  Steinmetz, supra note 126. 
 185.  Perritt, supra note 9, at 75.  
 186.  Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2280–87 (2018).  
 187.  Id. at 2284 (quoting Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984)).  
 188.  State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) (citation omitted).  
 189.  Brown v. Pro Football, No. 90-1071 (RCL), 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2903, at *28 (D.C. Cir. 





      06/12/2020   13:18:38
42394-ckt_95-1 Sheet No. 166 Side B      06/12/2020   13:18:38
12 ALEKNAVICUS MACRO 1 EIC 5.4 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/8/2020 11:26 PM 
324 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 95:1 
under the Sherman Antitrust Act, but if the pro-competitive effects outweigh 
the anti-competitive effects, then the restraint is lawful.190
Aside from the horizontal agreement, which is naturally presumed to be 
anti-competitive,191 the collective agreement imposes a pro-competitive ver-
tical price restraint. A vertical price restraint is defined as an “agreement[] 
involving actors at different levels of a distribution chain to set either mini-
mum or maximum prices.”192 Vertical price restraints typically occur be-
tween a manufacturer and a distributor or reseller, and under the collective 
agreement, the ride-hailing company would provide its platform to the on-
demand drivers, likewise to how a manufacturer would provide its product 
to a distributor; and then, in return for a fixed percentage earned on each ride, 
the on-demand driver would provide the platform’s service (in the form of 
rides) to consumers, similarly to how a distributor would provide a manu-
facturer’s product to consumers at a fixed price.193
Therefore, because the collective agreement imposes a vertical price re-
straint, it must be judged by the rule of reason.194 And ultimately, the collec-
tive agreement’s pro-competitive effects outweigh its anti-competitive 
effects because the vertical price restraint would reduce the ride-hailing com-
pany’s market power and eliminate adhesion contracts; and the vertical price 
restraint would correct switching costs and price inelasticity and reduce labor 
turnover in the on-demand driver labor market. 
1. The vertical price restraint reduces the ride-hailing company’s mar-
ket power and eliminates adhesion contracts in the on-demand driver  
labor market. 
Beginning with market power, the Supreme Court defined market 
power as “the ability of a single seller to raise price and restrict output, for 
reduced output is the almost inevitable result of higher prices.”195 Here, the 
ride-hailing company is the seller, and the on-demand drivers are the buy-
ers;196 and the price is the percentage of each ride’s cost that the ride-hailing 
company retains from the on-demand driver in exchange for the on-demand 
 190.  Id. 
 191.  See In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 316 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting the usual 
presumption that horizontal agreements are anti-competitive). 
 192.  Marion Diagnostic Ctr., LLC v. Becton, Dickinson, & Co., No. 18-CV-01059-NJR-RJD, 2018 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 203407, at *10 (S.D. Ill. Nov. 30, 2018) (citation omitted).  
 193.  See Vertical Price Restraints, MBASKOOL, https://www.mbaskool.com/business-con-
cepts/marketing-and-strategy-terms/14294-vertical-price-restraint.html [https://perma.cc/WG6Z-
AT4U]. 
 194.  See Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 907 (2007) 
 195.  Fortner Enters. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 503 (1969). 





      06/12/2020   13:18:38
42394-ckt_95-1 Sheet No. 167 Side A      06/12/2020   13:18:38
12 ALEKNAVICUS MACRO 1 EIC 5.4 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/8/2020 11:26 PM 
2020] ON-DEMAND DRIVERS AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 325 
driver’s use of its platform. Within the on-demand driver labor market, an 
oligopsony exists because there are few ride-hailing companies who provide 
platforms, and there are many on-demand drivers who utilize the platforms 
in order to provide on-demand rides.197 Therefore, a few ride-hailing com-
panies dominate the on-demand driver labor market, and as a result, “they 
have some degree of control over the [wages] they pay” to the on-demand 
drivers.198 Hence, the Supreme Court’s “concern . . . [that] the seller has the 
power to raise prices, or impose other burdensome terms” exists within the 
on-demand driver labor market.199
And the ride-hailing companies’ market power is illustrated by adhe-
sion contracts that pervade the on-demand driver labor market.200 Adhesion 
contracts occur when “one party has substantially more power than the other 
in creating the contract.”201 When considering the on-demand driver labor 
market, ride-hailing companies have disproportionate power, given that each 
ride-hailing company sets the terms for using its platform, and on-demand 
drivers “must accept them or not, on a take-it-or-leave-it [basis].”202 Indeed, 
Seattle’s City Council noted that ride-hailing companies “establish the terms 
and conditions of their drivers unilaterally, and may impose changes in driver 
compensation rates or deactivate drivers from dispatched services without 
prior discussion or warning.”203 Thus, ride-hailing companies function 
through adhesion contracts, which “preclude bargaining between buyer and 
seller, an assumption that underlies the model of perfect competition.”204
However, the collective agreement would advance competition because 
the vertical price restraint would reduce the ride-hailing company’s market 
power, and it would eliminate adhesion contracts in the on-demand driver 
labor market. Because the Seattle Ordinance permits the representative and 
the ride-hailing company to bargain collectively in regard to “the nature and 
amount of payments to be made by, or withheld from, the [ride-hailing com-
pany] to or by the [on-demand] drivers,”205 the vertical price restraint would 
diminish the ride-hailing company’s market power—significantly undercut-
ting the ride-hailing company’s ability to unilaterally control prices. And in 
 197.  Id. at 70–71. 
 198.  Id. at 71. 
 199.  U.S. Steel Corp., 394 U.S. at 504. 
 200.  See Perritt, supra note 9, at 72–73. 
 201.  Julia Kagan, Adhesion Contract, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/adhe-
sion-contract.asp [https://perma.cc/S769-B99X]. 
 202.  Perritt, supra note 9, at 72. 
 203.  Seattle, Wash., Ordinance 124968 § 1(E) (2015). 
 204.  Perritt, supra note 9, at 71; see N.Y. Shipping Asso. v. Fed. Mar. Com., 854 F.2d 1338, 1357 
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (noting that “a regime of adhesion contracts[] limits competition.”). 
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turn, the ride-hailing company could no longer utilize adhesion contracts, 
given that the vertical price restraint would be the result of a collectively 
bargained for agreement. 
Lastly, because the on-demand driver labor market is currently anti-
competitive due to the ride-hailing companies’ control over the percentage 
of each ride’s cost that they retain from each on-demand driver, the vertical 
price restraint would not create an anti-competitive effect; but instead, the 
vertical price restraint would “enable more stable [wages and] working con-
ditions and better ensure that [on-demand] drivers can perform their services 
in a . . . stable, cost-effective, and economically viable manner.”206 Thus, it 
would create a pro-competitive effect in the on-demand driver labor mar-
ket.207
2. The vertical price restraint corrects market inefficiencies. 
Vertical price restraints, and in general, “vertical contracts in a compet-
itive market encourage . . . innovation . . . and create efficiencies – and thus 
reduce prices and lead to better goods and services for consumers.”208 The 
vertical price restraint, as imposed by the collective agreement, would (1) 
correct switching costs, (2) fix price inelasticity, and (3) reduce labor turno-
ver in the on-demand driver labor market. 
Returning to the current labor market for on-demand drivers, further 
barriers to competition exist given that oligopsonies (the ride-hailing com-
panies), “exemplify a number of . . . market failure[s]” such as “switching 
costs . . . and price inelasticity.”209 “Switching costs are the costs that a con-
sumer incurs as a result of changing brands, suppliers or products.”210 Again, 
here, the on-demand driver is characterized as the consumer, choosing 
among the ride-hailing companies’ platforms that she or he wishes to utilize, 
and the ride-hailing company provides the product in the form of a platform. 
Switching costs considerations to an on-demand driver include not only the 
price differences among ride-hailing companies—specifically, the percent-
age of each ride’s cost that each ride-hailing company retains from the on-
demand driver—but also the fact that most ride-hailing companies’ 
 206.  ORDINANCE 124968 § 1(I). 
 207.  See Comcast Cable Communs., LLC v. FCC, 717 F.3d 982, 990 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (Kavanaugh, 
J., concurring) (citation omitted) (“[A]bsent market power . . . vertical contracts are procompetitive.”). 
 208.  Id. 
 209.  Perritt, supra note 9, at 71. 
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platforms are easily substitutable for one another in regard to the on-demand 
driver’s ability to provide on-demand rides.211
Low switching costs can be anti-competitive because if “[on-demand 
drivers] fail to base their choices on differences in prices . . . liberalisation of 
markets will not be successful.”212 And currently, switching costs are low for 
on-demand drivers.213 Without the vertical price restraint, the price differ-
ences among the platforms are immaterial to the on-demand drivers, given 
that they utilize multiple platforms. However, with the vertical price re-
straint, the price differences among the platforms would become a significant 
consideration for an on-demand driver. For example, if the original vertical 
price restraint set forth that the on-demand drivers retain 76.5% of each 
ride’s cost, and subsequently, a collective agreement by a separate repre-
sentative and ride-hailing company sets forth that the on-demand drivers re-
tain 78% of each ride’s cost, on-demand drivers will increasingly utilize the 
latter ride-hailing company’s platform. 
In response, the original ride-hailing company will have to either match 
or raise the percentage that its on-demand drivers retain for each ride’s cost 
in order to avoid a low supply of on-demand drivers and thus, avoid a de-
crease in output and revenue.214 Ensuing collective agreements among the 
remaining ride-hailing companies in Seattle’s on-demand driver labor mar-
ket will vary in regard to the percentage (per ride) retained by each ride-
hailing company’s on-demand drivers, but enough price differences among 
the platforms will exist, increasing switching costs for an individual on-de-
mand driver. While higher switching costs in other contexts can have anti-
competitive effects,215 here, a ride-hailing company could employ its collec-
tive agreement to gain a competitive edge in the on-demand driver labor 
market by offering a more attractive price, which in turn, will foster 
 211.  See id. (“Although most prevalent switching costs are monetary in nature . . . [a] switching cost 
can manifest itself in the form of . . . a failure to obtain similar replacement of products or services.”). 
 212.  Marc Pomp, et al., Switch on the Competition Clauses, Consequences and Policy Implications 
of Consumer Switching Costs, 97 CPB NETHERLANDS BUREAU FOR ECON. POL’Y ANALYSIS 1, 15 (2005), 
https://www.cpb.nl/sites/default/files/publicaties/download/switch-competition-causes-consequences-
and-policy-implications-consumer-switching-costs.pdf [http://perma.cc/B2VB-FMXY0].  
 213.  Perritt, supra note 9, at 73–74. 
 214.  See generally Pauline T. Kim, Norms, Learning, and Law: Exploring the Influences on Work-
ers’ Legal Knowledge, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 447, 482 n.138 (noting that a decrease in output creates a 
decrease in revenue). 
 215.  See Stefan Bechtold, Digital Rights Management in the United States and Europe, 52 AM. J.
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innovative responses by the other ride-hailing companies,216— effectuating 
a more competitive on-demand driver labor market. 
Turning to price inelasticity, for this Note’s purposes, I assume that un-
der the collective agreement, percentage rates retained by on-demand drivers 
during “surge pricing” will be an issue that is negotiated separately, from the 
issue of percentage rates retained by on-demand drivers for each ride’s cost 
when “surge pricing” is not occurring; thus, the following price elasticity 
analysis exclusively focuses on the latter of the two issues. The price elastic-
ity of demand is an “economic measure of the change in the quantity de-
manded . . . of a product in relation to its price change.”217 When the price is 
inelastic, its price “does not change even if supply or demand go up or 
down.”218 Presently, the price elasticity of demand in the on-demand driver 
labor market is relatively inelastic because on-demand drivers’ demand to 
utilize the platforms is insensitive to the set percentage rates that the ride-
hailing companies retain for each ride’s cost,219 as on-demand drivers depend 
on the platforms to provide rides in order to make extra money or earn a 
living.220 Price inelasticity of demand in the on-demand driver labor market 
is anti-competitive “because it [hinders] driver willingness to look for a bet-
ter deal.”221
But, with the vertical price restraint and successive collective agree-
ments by other ride-hailing companies, as discussed earlier, the price elas-
ticity of demand in the on-demand labor market will become more elastic 
because on-demand drivers will become more sensitive to the percentage rate 
differences among ride-hailing companies.222 And in an on-demand driver 
labor market where switching costs are high and where the price elasticity of 
demand is elastic, on-demand drivers will have reasonable substitutes among 
 216.  See generally F.T.C. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 598 (1967) (Harlan, J., concur-
ring) (“Economies achieved by one firm may stimulate matching innovation by others, the very essence 
of competition.”). 
 217.  Will Kenton, Price Elasticity of Demand, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.in-
vestopedia.com/terms/p/priceelasticity.asp [https://perma.cc/9L2R-BBUH]. 
 218.  Price Inelastic, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/eng-
lish/price-inelastic [https://perma.cc/H663-W4UQ]. 
 219.  See generally JPMorgan Chase & Co. Inst., The Online Platform Economy in 2018: Drivers, 
Workers, Sellers, and Lessors, JPMORGAN CHASE & CO. (2018), https://www.jpmorganchase.com/cor-
porate/institute/report-ope-2018.htm [https://perma.cc/Z6B7-6F-G]. 
 220.  See Razak v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 16-573, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61230, at *53–54 (E.D. Pa. 
Apr. 11, 2018) (“Uber’s drivers depend on Uber’s technology [for] getting jobs.”). 
 221.  Perritt, supra note 9, at 71. 
 222.  See Sean Ross, Types of Consumer Goods That Show the Price Elasticity of Demand,
INVESTOPEDIA (Dec. 5, 2019) https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/012615/what-types-con-
sumer-goods-demonstrate-price-elasticity-demand.asp [https://perma.cc/A68K-WASY] (“If the good 
has plenty of competitive substitutes, elasticity tends to be greater because consumers can easily make a 
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the platforms and will choose whichever platform is most attractive in regard 
to price. Thus, the vertical price restraint corrects price inelasticity of de-
mand in the labor market, creating a pro-competitive effect in the on-demand 
driver labor market.223
Lastly, labor turnover is “the rate at which [laborers] leave a company 
and are replaced by new [laborers].”224 In a competitive labor market, a lower 
labor turnover would promote productivity.225 However, in the current on-
demand driver labor market, “low pay is resulting in turnover,”226 which af-
fects the ride-hailing company’s output in the product market, as there have 
been “transportation service disruptions around the country.”227 But the ver-
tical price restraint would reduce labor turnover because the improved wages 
and working conditions would eliminate the low pay that is causing the turn-
over; “and thus keep a stable supply of experienced drivers on the road.”228
Studies have demonstrated that “members of collective bargaining units are 
more likely to stay in their jobs than other workers,”229 and the City of Seattle 
concluded that on-demand drivers who are working under conditions they 
agreed to are more likely to “devote more time to their work as [on-demand] 
drivers, because the terms are more likely to be satisfactory and responsive 
to the drivers’ needs and concerns.”230 Therefore, the vertical price restraint 
would “lead[] to lower workforce turnover and increased worker productiv-
ity,”231 creating a pro-competitive effect in the on-demand driver labor mar-
ket. 
 223.  See generally Jonathan M. Orszag & Loren K. Smith, Toward a More Complete Treatment of 
Efficiencies in Merger Analysis: Lessons from Recent Challenges, 16-1 ANTITRUST SRC. 1, 4 n.18 (2016), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/oct16_orszag_10_18f.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UHE6-SWNX] (“[M]arkets that experience more competition are associated with 
higher price elasticity of demand . . . .”). 
 224.  Labour Turnover, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/diction-
ary/english/labour-turnover [https://perma.cc/U2FE-WJM]. 
 225.  See generally Peggie R. Smith, Elder Care, Gender, and Work: The Work-Family Issue of the 
21st Century, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 351, 376 (2004) (observing for example, how private 
pensions during the industrial revolution “decrease[d] labor turnover . . . which promoted workplace 
productivity.”). 
 226.  Howard Greenwich & Hays Witt, Driving Public Good: How Collective Bargaining Can In-
crease Reliability & Safety in the Seattle For-Hire Transportation System, PUGET SOUND SAGE & P’SHIP
FOR WORKING FAMILIES 21 (2015), http://pugetsoundsage.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Driv-
ingPublicGood.pdf [https://perma.cc/6YEL-9F4G]. 
 227.  Seattle, Wash., Ordinance 124968 § 1(F) (2015). 
 228.  Greenwich & Witt, supra note 226, at 3. 
 229.  Id. at 21. 
 230.  124968 § (I)(1). 
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3. The anti-competitive effects do not outweigh the  
pro-competitive effects. 
The Supreme Court has stated that anti-competitive effects typically in-
clude “reduced output, increased prices, or decreased quality in the relevant 
market.”232 In regard to reduced output of supply in the on-demand driver 
labor market, it seems counterintuitive that the vertical price restraint would 
dissuade on-demand drivers from utilizing the particular ride-hailing com-
pany’s platform, given that the drivers would retain a larger percentage of 
each ride’s cost in comparison to utilizing other ride-hailing companies’ plat-
forms who have not yet reached a collective agreement with a representative. 
Indeed, a lower labor turnover in the on-demand driver labor market, as a 
result of the vertical price restraint, would increase the output of supply in 
the labor market, not reduce it.233
Also, because the Seattle Ordinance positions the on-demand drivers as 
independent contractors and not as employees,234 it seems unlikely that the 
collective agreement would lock in the on-demand drivers to the agreement 
to only utilizing that particular ride-hailing company’s platform and thus, 
creating an anti-competitive effect in the on-demand driver labor market by 
restricting the supply of labor.235 Instead, on-demand drivers would still have 
the same freedom to use multiple platforms to provide on-demand rides be-
cause it is unlikely that a ride-hailing company would agree to any terms 
under the collective agreement that would severely hinder the company’s 
ability to “tout flexibility and convenience for . . . [its’] workers,” given that 
flexibility and convenience is what has made ride-hailing companies so pop-
ular to begin with.236
Next, as previously mentioned, “[e]valuating both sides of a two-sided 
transaction platform is . . . necessary to accurately assess competition.”237
Therefore, it is necessary to consider reduced output in the product market 
but doing so necessarily requires examining price increases in the product 
market because ride-hailing companies, in response to retaining a smaller 
percentage of each ride’s cost due to the collective agreement, will seek to 
maximize their profits; thus, they will likely pass at least some, if not most, 
 232.  Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2284 (2018) (citations omitted).  
 233.  See Greenwich & Witt, supra note 226, at 3. 
 234.  See Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. City of Seattle, 890 F.3d 769, 777 (9th Cir. 
2018). 
 235.  See generally Joel M. Wallace, Rambus v. F.T.C. in the Context of Standard-Setting Organiza-
tions, Antitrust, and the Patent Hold-up Problem, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 661, 663, 665 (2009) (ob-
serving how technology lock in can be an anticompetitive issue); Perritt, supra note 38, at 132.  
 236.  Kennedy, supra note 1, at 992.  
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of the cost off to consumers by increasing the cost of rides, possibly creating 
an anti-competitive effect.238 However, “[d]emand-side studies reinforce the 
intuition that passengers are relatively insensitive to price, but more sensitive 
to waiting times . . . .”239 In Seattle, consumers “take[] over five million [on-
demand] trips each year and, with demand growing, the number of trips pro-
vided is increasing.”240 Furthermore, mobility impaired consumers with lim-
ited transportation options and consumers without access to public 
transportation rely on on-demand rides to get around.241 Thus, consumers’ 
high demand for on-demand rides is unlikely to be significantly affected by 
a minor increase in the price of rides. 
Turning to reduced quality of the platform in the product market, the 
increased supply of on-demand drivers, as a result of the vertical price re-
straint, will likely decrease waiting times for consumers, improving the over-
all quality of the platform’s service.242 And low labor turnover may 
ultimately lead to safer rides for considers, given that “increased safety has 
been associated with longer job tenure, and longer tenure will result in more 
experienced [on-demand] drivers on the road, increasing both safety and re-
liability for the whole [on-demand] system.”243 Increased safety is especially 
critical to “[t]ravelers making late night trips for recreation, airport journeys 
and after-hour commutes [who] have long-relied on [on-demand] ser-
vices,”244 given that “the risk of a fatal crash is three times greater at 
night . . . .”245 Thus, in the product market, the vertical price restraint would 
improve the quality of the ride-hailing company’s platform by increasing the 
safety of its use. 
However, when considering reduced quality of the platform for the on-
demand drivers, one could argue that the ride-hailing company would re-
spond to the foregone revenue caused by the collective agreement by cutting 
 238.  See Andrew Edgecliffe-Johnson, US Companies Push Rising Costs on to Customers, FIN.
TIMES (Aug. 19, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/500a359c-a369-11e8-8ecf-a7ae1beff35b 
[https://perma.cc/5QHE-XNGY] (noting that as a result of increased costs, including labor costs, compa-
nies in the United States are increasingly raising the prices of their products to consumers in order to 
offset the increased costs). 
 239.  Perritt, supra note 9, at 77. 
 240.  Greenwich & Witt, supra note 226, at 3 (emphasis added). 
 241.  Id. at 3, 5–6. 
 242.  See Seattle, Wash., Ordinance 124968 § 1(I)(1) (2015) (finding that the Seattle Ordinance “will 
improve the safety and reliability of the [on-demand] transportation services provided by the [ride-hailing 
companies] and reduce the safety and reliability problems created by frequent turnover in the [on-de-
mand] services industry.”). 
 243.  Greenwich & Witt, supra note 226, at 22. 
 244.  Id. at 5. 
 245.  The Most Dangerous Time to Drive: As We ‘Fall Back’ to Shorter Days, Take Extra Care on 
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internal costs, including maintenance costs,246 which could reduce the qual-
ity of the platform for the on-demand drivers. If other ride-hailing companies 
subsequently reach collective agreements and respond in a similar manner 
as the original ride-hailing company, it could generate a “race to the bottom” 
in the on-demand driver labor market where ride-hailing companies would 
“attempt[] to undercut the competition’s prices” by scarifying the quality of 
their platforms for on-demand drivers.247 And if the “race to the bottom” 
renders the platform increasingly difficult to use by the on-demand drivers, 
that effect could spill over into the product market, decreasing the overall 
quality of rides for consumers. 
But a “race to the bottom” is unlikely to occur because the Seattle Or-
dinance’s framework prevents ride-hailing companies from undermining the 
purposes of the Ordinance. First, if the representative believes that the plat-
form is deteriorating in quality, due to the ride-hailing company’s mainte-
nance costs cuts, the representative can submit proposed amendments (to the 
collective agreement) to the director.248 These amendments would likely en-
tail that the ride-hailing company maintain the platform to an acceptable 
standard. Because such amendments would “further[] . . . safe, reliable and 
economical [on-demand] transportation services and the public policy goals” 
of the Ordinance,249 the director would likely approve the amendments. 
Second, if such a standard for the platform is already present in the col-
lective agreement, the representative can allege that the ride-hailing com-
pany has violated the agreement, in which case, the director would 
investigate the alleged violation; and if the director concludes that the ride-
hailing company has violated the collective agreement, the director would 
issue the ride-hailing company a written notice, “requir[ing] the . . . entity in 
violation to comply with the requirement.”250 Furthermore, the written notice 
would inform the ride-hailing company that it faces an accruing “daily pen-
alty of up to $10,000 for every day the [ride-hailing company] fails to cure 
the violation.”251 Facing such potentially large monetary losses, the ride-hail-
ing company would likely comply with the collective agreement by either 
stopping maintenance cost cuts or by reversing course and increasing 
 246.  See generally Michael Reich, et al., Effects of a $15 Minimum Wage in California and Fresno,
INST. FOR RESEARCH ON LAB. & EMP. 26 (2017), http://irle.berkeley.edu/files/2017/Effects-of-a-15-Min-
imum-Wage-in-California-and-Fresno.pdf [https://perma.cc/U5Q4-WZ69]. 
 247.  Will Kenton, Race to the Bottom, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/race-
bottom.asp [https://perma.cc/59ST-9M2A]. 
 248.  SEATTLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE § 6.310.735(J) (2015). 
 249.  Id.
 250.  Id. § 6.310.735(M)(1)(b)(1). 
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maintenance of the platform in order to comply with the collective agree-
ment’s conditions for the platform.252 Hence, the Seattle Ordinance’s frame-
work prevents the ride-hailing company from undermining the purposes of 
the Ordinance and thus, prevents a “race to the bottom” from occurring. 
In conclusion, because the vertical price restraint’s pro-competitive ef-
fects, such as reducing ride-hailing companies’ market power, eliminating 
adhesion contracts, correcting switching costs and price inelasticity, and re-
ducing labor turnover in the on-demand driver labor market, outweighs the 
vertical price restraint’s anti-competitive effects and the anti-competitive as-
sumption associated with the horizontal agreement, the collective agreement 
satisfies the Rule of Reason, and thus, is a reasonable and lawful restraint of 
trade under the Sherman Antitrust Act. 
CONCLUSION
In sum, the Seattle Ordinance “represents an innovative and real oppor-
tunity to both solve long-standing challenges in the [on-demand driver labor 
market] and provide a path forward for how cities can ensure safe and relia-
ble transportation in our ever-evolving economy.”253 Thus, such a novel Or-
dinance that deals with a relatively new gig economy should invite new 
thinking and reasoning in regard to the intersection of federal antitrust laws 
and labor laws. So, by re-examining the Labor Exemption’s text, purpose, 
and its application by the Supreme Court, there is enough support to suggest 
that the Labor Exemption would exempt the Seattle Ordinance from antitrust 
liability. Or, alternatively, by truly considering the Ordinance’s effects on 
competition through the Rule of Reason, enough evidence suggests that it 
would not violate the Sherman Antitrust Act. Either way, both arguments 
demonstrate that the Seattle Ordinance is not only permissible but also, law-
ful. 
 252.  See Daniele Nosenzo, Encouraging Compliance: Bonuses Versus Fines in Inspection Games,
JLEO (2014) (“In an experiment we find that fines are effective in deterring non-compliance.”) (quotation 
in Abstract).
 253.  Greenwich & Witt, supra note 226, at 4.  
